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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid Act mandates that state
reimbursement rates for participating Medicaid providers be consistent with
(1) efficiency, (2) economy, (3) access to health care, and (4) quality health
care.1 These four nebulous factors have produced discordant interpretations
by federal courts reviewing the validity of state Medicaid reimbursement

*
Law Clerk, Hon. Kenneth J. Meyers, United States Bankruptcy Court, Southern
District of Illinois. This Article does not necessarily represent the views of any judges of the
Southern District of Illinois. This Article would not have been possible without the
inspiration, guidance, and support provided by Professor Sidney Watson, Saint Louis
University Center for Health Law Studies. All errors are my own.
1
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (2014). The terms “rates” and “reimbursement
rates” as used in this Article refer to the payment of Medicaid-participating health care
providers. “Rate setting” refers to the states determination of Medicaid reimbursement rates.
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rates, resulting in a lack of uniformity in the statute’s interpretation.2 The
United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Douglas v. Independent
Living Center of Southern California, Inc. added a degree of uniformity to
rate setting litigation with its suggestion that rate setting plaintiffs challenge
rate adjustments under the judicial review procedures of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA).3 The APA provides litigants with a secure cause of
action and consistent standards of review, allowing for more unanimity in
judicial assessments of § 30(A).4
Douglas, however, did not solve all problems. Section 30(A)
requires that states determine their rate adjustments’ effects on all four of the
statute’s factors. 5 Rate setting litigation, however, has focused almost
exclusively on § 30(A)’s access requirement. 6 Accordingly, Medicaid
providers and beneficiaries argue that rate reductions reduce provider
participation in Medicaid, thus lowering beneficiaries’ access to care.7 The
statute’s first two factors, efficiency and economy, address the need to cap
reimbursement rates at economical levels and therefore do not generally
interest plaintiffs.8 The quality of care received by Medicaid beneficiaries is
an important health care concern that implicates all provider settings and
patient experiences.9 Notably, however, quality of care has been given scant
2

See infra note 84 and accompanying text (noting the varying approaches
employed by the federal appellate courts in interpreting § 30(A) prior to the Court’s decision
in Douglas).
3
Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1204, 1210 (2012);
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 (2014) et seq. Medicaid providers, including
physicians and skilled nursing facilities, and beneficiaries challenge state Medicaid
reimbursement rates they believe are too low to adequately compensate providers for their
services, and therefore risk affecting provider participation rates in the Medicaid program. See
Nicole Huberfeld, Where There is a Right, There Must be a Remedy (Even in Medicaid), 102
KY. L. J. 327, 348 (2014) (writing that “[w]hen providers are dissatisfied with the state
payment levels and methodologies, they typically will first appeal to the state’s Medicaid
agency. If that is unsuccessful, then providers will team up with patients to enjoin the state’s
low payment rates in federal court.”).
4
See infra text accompanying notes 79–82 (discussing the consistency provided
when actions are brought under the APA).
5
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
6
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the access-centric approach employed by
reviewing courts).
7
See, e.g., Memisovski ex rel. Memisovski v. Maram, No. 92 C 1982, 2004 WL
1878332, at *41 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 23, 2004) (summarizing the plaintiffs’ contentions that “(1)
the law requires that Medicaid reimbursement rates paid to health care providers be sufficient
to provide Medicaid recipients access to health care equal to that of the generally insured
population; (2) the arbitrary and capricious manner in which the defendants set reimbursement
rates has resulted in rates that are far too low to result in equal access to care; and (3) plaintiffs
endure obstacles to finding care not faced by privately insured patients and, as a result, the
health problems they experience are both more acute and more preventable”).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 61, 167 (explaining that § 30(A)’s first two
factors set the federal ceiling for reimbursement rates to Medicaid providers).
9
BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW CASES, MATERIALS & PROBLEMS 1 (7th
ed. 2013) (explaining that “[c]ost, quality, access, and choice are the chief concerns of the
health care system”).

http://digitalcommons.hamline.edu/hlr/vol38/iss1/3

2

Sheffner: Rate Setting After Douglas

2015]

RATE SETTING AFTER DOUGLAS

59

attention by courts and the state and federal governments in their setting and
review of reimbursement rates.10
In Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS,
however, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals became the first court to
emphasize § 30(A)’s quality prong. 11 In Christ the King, the court
invalidated nursing home rate adjustments proposed by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania due to the complete absence of any examination of the rate
adjustment’s effects on the quality of care produced by the affected
institutions.12 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was the first post-Douglas
federal appellate court to invalidate a state’s rate setting proposal.
After providing background as to the current state of Medicaid and
its reimbursement programs, this article suggests that the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals’ decision in Christ the King indicates that, consistent with
§ 30(A), quality is a truly independent statutory factor that must be
accounted for when setting Medicaid provider reimbursement rates. 13
Furthermore, Christ the King delineates helpful guidelines for states, and
CMS, in accounting for quality in their rate setting proposals going
forward.14
II. BACKGROUND
Part II.A provides a brief overview of the Medicaid program and the
state rate setting process. 15 Part II.B discusses § 30(A)’s statutory
requirements and Douglas’s role in providing a measure of uniformity in
§ 30(A) litigation in order to illuminate the changing direction of Medicaid
rate setting law.16 Part II.B further discusses the access-centric approach that
has marked much of rate setting litigation, and the lack of focus states and
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) have placed on
§ 30(A)’s quality prong.17 Part II.C examines the Third Circuit’s decision in
Christ the King, concluding that the decision’s importance lies in its
emphasis on § 30(A)’s quality of care prong, rather than exclusively access,

10
See infra Part II.B.3 (illustrating the absence of quality of care analysis that
results from the access-centric approach).
11
Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS, 730 F.3d
291 (3d Cir. 2013).
12
Id. at 309–14.
13
See infra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need to analyze
quality after Christ the King).
14
See infra Part III.A–C (discussing guidelines provided by Christ the King in the
assessment of quality as an independent factor in § 30(A)). The reviewing federal agency is
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), a division of the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), which is tasked with ensuring that state plans comply with the
Medicaid Act. Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 297.
15
See infra Part II.A.
16
See infra Part II.B.
17
See infra Part II.B.
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indicating that quality of care is a truly independent factor in the § 30(A)
calculus that must be considered by states, CMS, and courts.18
A. Medicaid and State Rate Setting
The Medicaid program is vital to the provision of medical assistance
to many of the nation’s disadvantaged.19 The flexibility provided to states
under Medicaid, however, allows states to cut provider reimbursement rates
in the face of bulging Medicaid rolls caused by high under- and
unemployment.20 Low reimbursement causes correspondingly low provider
participation in Medicaid, which inexorably leads to barriers to accessible
and quality health care. 21 This section broadly summarizes the Medicaid
program and examines the process of and problems with state Medicaid rate
setting.
1. The Medicaid Program
Medicaid is a joint federal-state health insurance program, financed
by the federal and state governments, and administered by the states. 22
Codified at Title XIX of the Social Security Act, the Medicaid program
provides medical assistance to over 60 million disadvantaged children,
pregnant women, disabled individuals, seniors, and individuals newly
eligible under the Affordable Care Act’s (ACA) Medicaid Expansion. 23 A
product of the Spending Clause, the federal government funds a portion of
each state’s Medicaid program on the condition that each state provide
specific medical benefits to mandatory categories of individuals. 24 The
18

See infra Part II.C.
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1208 (noting that “Medicaid is a cooperative federalstate program that provides medical care to needy individuals.”).
20
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing state rate setting generally).
21
See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing state rate adjustments’ effects on access and
quality).
22
Kaiser Comm’n on Medicaid and the Uninsured, Medicaid Moving Forward,
KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 1 (June 2014), http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.
com/2014/06/7235-07-medicaid-moving-forward2.pdf. (discussing Medicaid generally).
23
42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq.; Renee M. Landers & Patrick A. Leeman, Medicaid
Expansion under the 2010 Health Care Reform Legislation: The Continuing Evolution of
Medicaid’s Central Role in American Health Care, 7 NAELA J. 143, 143, 146 (2010) (listing
the populations covered by Medicaid prior to the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion); Sidney D.
Watson, Embracing Justice Roberts’ “New Medicaid,” 6 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y
247, 255–56 (2013) (discussing newly eligible individuals under the ACA’s Medicaid
Expansion).
24
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The
Spending Clause, Section 1983, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. DAVIS. L. REV. 413, 419–
20 (2008) [hereinafter Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle], (stating that “the federal
government promises federal money to the states in exchange for states’ promise to fulfill
certain conditions on those funds by providing medical assistance to mandatory categories of
people”). To help ease the financial burden on the states, the federal government matches a
19
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bedrock of the country’s safety net system, Medicaid is necessary for the
provision of medical and other health services to the nation’s most
underprivileged citizens.25
States are given wide flexibility in administering and financing their
Medicaid programs. 26 This flexibility includes the authority to decide the
level of participating Medicaid providers’ payments. 27 While federal law
requires that each state’s program provide for specific mandatory benefits
and eligibility categories, states are free to cover certain optional benefits and
categories of individuals.28 States may also seek waivers from federal law to
use federal funds for demonstration or other purposes.29
States memorialize their Medicaid programs in a state plan, which is
submitted to CMS for approval. 30 A state must submit a state plan
amendment (SPA) to CMS if it makes any material changes, such as
adjusting provider reimbursement rates, to its plan for medical assistance.31
percentage of state Medicaid payments. FURROW, supra note 9, at 828 (stating that the federal
government funds a portion of each states’ Medicaid program). This match, known as the
federal medical assistance percentage (FMAP), ranges from 50–74%, depending on each
state’s per capita income. Id. at 836; Landers & Leeman, supra note 23, at 147 (stating that
federal assistance ranges 50–76%). The FMAP for Medicaid expenditures for the newly
eligible population is 100%, as of last January 1, 2014, through 2016, and will decrease
incrementally until 2020, in which the FMAP for such newly eligible individuals will remain
constant at 90%. Id. at 152–54 (explaining the enhanced FMAP under the Medicaid
Expansion).
25
See Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 24, at 419 (stating that
“Medicaid is not perfect (or philosophically coherent), but it is indispensable as the most
consistent device that ensures access to healthcare for underprivileged populations”); Brietta
R. Clark, Medicaid Access, Rate Setting and Payment Suits: How the Obama Administration
is Undermining its Own Health Reform Goals, 55 HOW. L. J. 771, 784–85 (2012) [hereinafter
Rate Setting and Payment Suits] (discussing the benefits and effectiveness of the Medicaid).
26
Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services,76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26342 (proposed May 6, 2011) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt.
447) (noting that State Medicaid Programs “have considerable flexibility”).
27
Id. (discussing State Medicaid Programs generally).
28
See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 778 n.16 (noting that
“the law gives states the option of covering additional services, such as private nursing, adult
dental, and physical, occupational, and speech therapy”). Optional benefits include mental and
dental care, and optional categories of individuals include the “medically needy.” Id.
29
Watson, supra note 23, at 250 n.18 (citing § 1115 of the Social Security Act,
which grants “the Secretary of Health and Human Services broad authority to waive statutory
and regulatory provisions of health and welfare programs, like Medicaid”). The Secretary of
HHS may approve demonstration projects that allow states to provide services or cover
individuals otherwise prohibited by federal law. Watson, supra note 23, at 250.
30
42 C.F.R. § 430.10, et seq. (regulating SPAs); see also Megan Waugh, A
Broke(n) System: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Decision to Rule on the Equal Access
Provision in Douglas v. Independent Living Center, and its Potential Impact on the Affordable
Care Act, 32 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 855, 859–60 (2012) (discussing the
Medicaid Program generally and state plan submissions to HHS).
31
42 C.F.R. § 430.12 (providing procedural guidelines for SPA submissions);
Waugh, supra note 30, at 861 (stating that “[i]f a state makes a material change to the law,
organization, policy or operation within the Medicaid program, a state must file an SPA with
the CMS”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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CMS must review each plan and SPA to determine whether a state’s
Medicaid program complies with federal law.32 This process is devoid of any
formal procedures, and many SPAs are given only cursory review.33
2. State Rate Setting
Each state’s Medicaid program relies on the participation of private
health care providers to treat Medicaid patients.34 However, pursuant to the
flexibility they enjoy under Medicaid, states frequently reduce provider rates
in poor economic times when, due to a rise in unemployment, Medicaid rolls
increase.35 This increase in enrollment strains state budgets, causing them to
seek ways to make up for the decrease in tax revenues caused by increased
unemployment. 36 Rather than cut eligibility, a politically unpopular move,
states instead reduce provider payment rates.37 A 50-state survey conducted
by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured reported that in
2013, 38 states cut reimbursement rates of some kind.38

32

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(b) (“The Secretary shall approve any plan which fulfills
the conditions specified in subsection (a) of this section [delineating SPA requirements]”).
33
Brietta Clark, The (In)decision of Douglas v. ILC: The Relevance of CMS
Approval in Challenges to Medicaid Payment Cuts, HEALTH CARE JUSTICE BLOG (Feb. 29,
2012),
http://healthcarejusticeblog.org/2012/02/us_supreme_cour.html
(writing
that
“[r]eviews of state plans have been cursory, at best, and are often approved by default”).
34
Spectrum Health Continuing Care Grp. v. Anna Marie Bowling Irrecoverable
Trust Dated June 27, 2002, 410 F.3d 304, 313 (6th Cir. 2005) (discussing the nature of the
Medicaid program, and stating that “[a] health-care provider is not required to participate in
the Medicaid program, but rather voluntarily contracts with the state to provide services to
Medicaid-eligible patients in return for reimbursement from the state at the specified rates”).
35
See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 774 (discussing the
flexibility Congress gave the states in setting rates); Vernon K. Smith et al., Medicaid in a
Historic Time of Transformation: Results from a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State
Fiscal Years 2013 and 2014, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 47 (Oct. 2013) [hereinafter Smith, FY
2013–14],
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/10/8498-medicaid-in-ahistoric-time-of-transformation.pdf. (explaining that states cut rates to control costs during the
Great Recession and the 2001–2004 economic downturn).
36
See Vernon K. Smith et al., Moving Ahead Among Fiscal Challenges: A Look
at Medicaid Spending, Coverage and Policy Trends, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., at 15 (Oct.
2011),
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01/8248.pdf
[hereinafter
Smith, FY 2011–2012] (writing that “[d]uring an economic downturn, high unemployment
puts upward pressure on Medicaid. As individuals lose jobs and their incomes decline, more
individuals qualify and enroll in Medicaid which increases program spending.”).
37
Abigail Moncrieff, Payments to Medicaid Doctors: Interpreting the “Equal
Access” Provision, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 673, 673 (2006) (stating that “[s]tates . . . are hesitant to
push for large-scale reductions in eligibility or benefits because excluding needy people from
existing welfare programs is politically unattractive and may be financially unwise”); Smith,
FY 2011–2012, supra note 35, at 31 (explaining that states reduce provider payments during
economic downturns).
38
Smith, FY 2013–2014, supra note 35, at 47–48 (discussing state rate cuts in
2013). The ACA temporarily prevented states from decreasing primary care physician rates,
beginning in 2013. Id. at 48. While 40 states reported increasing rates for some providers in
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Rate adjustments that cause low reimbursement levels have a direct
impact on access to provider services and quality of care. 39 Nationally,
Medicaid physician rates are 66% that of Medicare.40 Provider participation
in Medicaid is voluntary, but is also low: physician participation in Medicaid
and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) is 75% nationally,
lower than Medicare, which causes resultant barriers to access to care.41 One
study found that 95% of physicians who did not participate in Medicaid cited
low reimbursement as the reason.42 In 2011, only about 69% of participating
physicians accepted new Medicaid patients. 43 The expansion of Medicaid
under the ACA may portend further drops in participation.44
Low Medicaid reimbursement also has detrimental effects on
quality. Low rates lead to low nursing home staffing levels, which lead to
concomitant decreases in the quality of nursing home care.45 Further, there is
2013 the magnitude of some rate cuts is alarming: California and Maine, for example, cut
outpatient reimbursement rates by 10%. Id. at 47–49.
39
See Smith, FY 2011–2012, supra note 36, at 31 (stating that”[p]rovider rates
are an important determinant of provider participation and access to services for Medicaid
beneficiaries, so cutting Medicaid rates (which are typically lower than Medicare or
commercial insurance) can jeopardize provider participation in the program as well as
access”); Brietta R. Clark, APA Deference after Independent Living Center: Why Informal
Adjudicatory Action Needs a Hard Look, 102 KY. L. J. 211, 217 (2014) [hereinafter APA
Deference after Independent Living Center] (stating that rate cuts decrease provider
participation in Medicaid and therefore endanger beneficiaries’ access to Medicaid services).
40
Medicaid-to-Medicare Fee Index, KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org
/medicaid/state-indicator/medicaid-to-medicare-fee-index/ (last visited March 20, 2014).
41
State Children’s Health Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa (2014) et seq.;
Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties: Medicaid and Coercion in
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1, 15, 20 (2013)
(explaining that Medicaid is voluntary for states and providers); FURROW, supra note 9, at
850–51 (writing that “Medicaid only pays physicians about 72% of what Medicare pays” and
that physician participation in Medicaid and CHIP is about three-quarters nationally); Smith,
FY 2011–2012, supra note 36, at 31 (noting that “cutting Medicaid rates (which are typically
lower than Medicare or commercial insurance) can jeopardize provider participation in the
program as well as access”); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 785–86 (stating
that low physician participation in Medicaid “impedes access to regular, preventive care”).
42
Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 786 (citing U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, MEDICAID AND CHIP: MOST PHYSICIANS SERVE COVERED CHILDREN
BUT HAVE DIFFICULTY REFERRING THEM FOR SPECIALTY CARE 18 (2011), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11624.pdf.).
43
Sandra L. Decker, In 2011 Nearly One-Third of Physicians Said They Would
Not Accept New Medicaid Patients, But Rising Fees May Help, 31 HEALTH AFF. 1673, 1675
(2011) (noting that approximately 69% of participating physicians accepted new Medicaid
patients in 2011).
44
Abby Goodnough, Medicaid Growth Could Aggravate Doctor Shortage, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 28, 2013, at A1 (reporting that many physicians may refuse to accept new patients
under the Medicaid Expansion due to low reimbursement rates).
45
See Charlene Harrington et al., Nurse Staffing Levels and Medicaid
Reimbursement Rates in Nursing Facilities, 42 HEALTH SERV. RESEARCH 1105, 1124 (2011)
(reporting the results of a study that were consistent with earlier findings in which nursing
“facilities with higher proportions of Medicaid residents had fewer nurses and consequently . .
. appeared to have lower quality of care”).
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evidence that some of the participating Medicaid providers provide a degree
of care lower than that provided by those who primarily treat Medicare and
privately insured patients.46
B. Section 30(A) and State Rate Setting Litigation
Section 30(A) of the Medicaid program provides the authority by
which Medicaid providers and beneficiaries challenge state Medicaid rate
adjustments.47 Bereft of a private right of action, plaintiffs have traditionally
enforced the Medicaid Act’s provisions, including § 30(A), with 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, a civil rights statute, or the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. 48 The Supreme Court, in Douglas, suggested an alternative
vehicle through which to enforce § 30(A)—the judicial review provisions of
the APA.49 The APA allows for a degree of uniformity that had been absent
in rate setting litigation. 50 Decisions both before and after Douglas have
focused mainly on the access requirement imposed by § 30(A), giving less
weight to the provision’s quality prong.51 This access-centric trend, however,
has been upset by the Christ the King decision’s focus on quality. 52 This
section contains an overview of § 30(A) litigation, the Douglas decision, and
rate setting litigation’s predominate focus on access.53
1. Section 30(A)
Congress enacted § 30(A) of the Medicaid Act in 1989 to prevent
states from arbitrarily reducing Medicaid reimbursement rates. 54 Since the
1997 repeal of a similar rate setting provision, the Boren Amendment,
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have challenged Medicaid rate
adjustments under § 30(A), first through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and following the

46

See FURROW, supra note 9, at 851 (noting that many Medicaid beneficiaries
receive substandard physician services).
47
See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing § 30(A) generally).
48
See infra Part II.B.1 (explaining that § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause have
historically served as the basis for rate setting litigation).
49
See infra text accompany notes 79–82 (discussing the Court’s suggestion in
Douglas that aggrieved plaintiffs proceed under the APA).
50
See infra text accompanying note 82 (discussing the consistency provided
when actions are brought under the APA).
51
See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the access-centric approach employed by
reviewing courts).
52
See infra Part II.C (discussing the Third Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Christ the King).
53
See infra Parts II.A–C.
54
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at
800–01 (noting that § 30(A) was enacted “to ensure that state flexibility in rate-setting did not
result in state disregard for federal protections with respect to the adequacy of rates, and their
impact on access and quality”).
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Supreme Court’s near-foreclosure of § 1983, 55 the Supremacy Clause56 and
the APA. 57 While CMS may withhold funds from states for violating
§ 30(A), the agency is deservedly reluctant to impose a penalty that would
most affect individuals dependent on governmental funding for their medical
care. 58 Therefore, litigation is a crucial tool through which to enforce the
Medicaid Acts’ requirements.
Section 30(A) mandates that a state’s Medicaid plan:
[P]rovide such methods and procedures relating to the
utilization of, and payment for, care and services available
55
Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 802–03 (discussing the
repeal of the Boren Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1982)). 42 U.S.C. § 1983
states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .
Section 1983 is a particularly attractive statute through which to enforce civil rights because a
companion statute provides winning plaintiffs reasonable attorneys’ fees. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b) (2014). However, in 2002, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Gonzaga
University v. Doe impeded the ability to bring § 1983 claims under the Spending Clause. 536
U.S. 273, 280 (2001) (holding that § 1983 confers a right to privately enforce a Spending
Clause statute only where the statute in question “manifests an ‘unambiguous’ intent to confer
individual rights”). See also infra note 87 and accompanying text (discussing the federal
circuit court split on this issue).
56
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Martina Brendel, When a Door Closes, a Window
Opens Up: Using Preemption to Challenge State Medicaid Cutbacks, 86 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
925, 926–27 (2011) (discussing the Supremacy Clause as an alternative means to enforce
§ 30(A) in absence of § 1983).
57
See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care v. Sebelius, 716 F.3d 1235, 1240 (9th Cir.
2013) (plaintiffs challenging reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the
Supremacy Clause); Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 296 (3d Cir. 2013) (plaintiff challenging
reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the Supremacy Clause).
58
See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 52 (1981) (White,
J., dissenting) (noting that, despite the ability to cut off funds, the judicial “reluctance is
founded on the perception that a funds cutoff is a drastic remedy with injurious consequences
to the supposed beneficiaries of the Act”). CMS’s authority to cut off fund is derived from 42
U.S.C. § 1396c (2014), which states:
If the Secretary, after reasonable notice and opportunity for hearing to the
State agency administering or supervising the administration of the State
plan approved under this subchapter, finds—
(1) that the plan has been so changed that it no longer complies
with the provisions of section 1396a of this title; or
(2) that in the administration of the plan there is a failure to
comply substantially with any such provision;
the Secretary shall notify such State agency that further payments will not
be made to the State . . . . until the Secretary is satisfied that there will no
longer be any such failure to comply. Until he is so satisfied he shall make
no further payments to such State . . . .
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under the plan . . . as may be necessary . . . to assure that
payments are consistent with [1] efficiency, [2] economy,
and [3] quality of care and [4] are sufficient to enlist enough
providers so that care and services are available under the
plan at least to the extent that such care and services are
available to the general population in the geographic
area . . . .59
Section 30(A) sets a federal floor and ceiling for provider rates, guaranteeing
that Medicaid beneficiaries receive accessible, quality medical care of the
same degree as privately insured individuals in an economical and efficient
manner.60
Section 30(A)’s first two factors, efficiency and economy, serve as
the federal ceiling for Medicaid payment rates by mandating that payments
be no more than “necessary . . . to assure” consistency “with efficiency [and]
economy,” and are commonly evaluated together.61 The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals historically focused on these two factors in interpreting § 30(A).62
As such, the Ninth Circuit’s approach required, until recently, that states
examine cost studies prior to cutting rates in order to assess how the cuts
compared to the costs of providing Medicaid services. 63 The cost studies
approach included a procedural requirement that ensured a relatively
searching level of judicial review. 64 However, since the Supreme Court’s
decision in Douglas, patients and providers have brought § 30(A) claims in
the Ninth Circuit against CMS under the APA, instead of merely against the
state. 65 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has deferred to the Department of
Health and Human Services’ (HHS) interpretation of § 30(A), resulting in

59

42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added).
Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 676–77 (writing that “[a]lthough the states have
flexibility in setting the amount that they are willing to pay for healthcare services or for
managed care coverage, Title XIX sets a ceiling and a floor on payments”).
61
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A); Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n v. Betlach, 865
F. Supp. 2d 984, 995 (D. Ariz. 2012) (analyzing efficiency and economy together). See also
Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 676–77 (implying that the efficiency and economy factors are the
federal ceiling); APA Deference after Independent Living Center, supra note 39, at 217
(writing that “economy and efficiency . . . are typically understood to reflect federal concerns
about payments being too high”).
62
See Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 678 (writing that “the Ninth Circuit has
focused primarily on the ‘efficiency’ and ‘economy’ requirements of § 30(A), holding that
rates violate the Medicaid statute if they do not reflect the costs of providing care, even if the
rates are sufficient to sustain equal access”).
63
Orthopaedic Hosp. v. Belshe, 103 F.3d 1491, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding
that rates comply with § 30(A) if they “bear a reasonable relationship to provider costs”).
64
APA Deference after Independent Living Center, supra note 39, at 213
(commenting that the Ninth Circuit historically applied “robust judicial review” to rate cuts).
65
See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1235; Ariz. Hosp. & Health
Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 984.
60
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the abandonment of the cost studies requirement, and a near-singular focus
on access.66
Section 30(A)’s last two factors, access and quality of care, serve as
the federal floor for payment rates.67 These factors require that each state’s
Medicaid program provide patients access to quality care.68 Access to care in
the United States is predominately based on access to health insurance.69 The
provision of Medicaid services ensures that many Americans receive health
care services that they would otherwise not receive. 70 However, access to
care is also implicated by the availability of provider services.71 Costs that
are too efficient and economical deter many providers from participating in
Medicaid, thus limiting the avenues through which beneficiaries may attain
health services.72
“Quality” health care is difficult to define. The Institute of Medicine
defines quality care as “the degree to which health services for individuals
and populations increase the likelihood of desired health outcomes and are
consistent with current professional knowledge.”73 Other definitions abound,
but quality care at base must embody care that adequately advances patient
welfare. 74 Perhaps as difficult a task as defining quality is selecting the
“correct” approach to measuring the quality of any given patient’s care.
Should quality be measured by outcome? Patient satisfaction? Structural or
“process” standards?75 Does quality depend on whether the provider at issue
is an individual or an institution?

66
See Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1249–51 (holding that the cost
study’s methodology is not required by § 30(A) and providing deference to CMS’s approval
of California’s rate cuts).
67
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A).
68
Id.
69
See FURROW, supra note 9, at 3 (noting that, unlike many other systems in the
developed world that provide universal health care to citizens, the United States’ health care
system is based on a mix of private and public insurance).
70
See supra text accompanying notes 23–25 (noting that Medicaid is necessary to
millions of the nation’s most underprivileged citizens).
71
See supra text accompanying notes 39–42 (explaining that low Medicaid
reimbursement rates cause low physician-participation in Medicaid).
72
See supra text accompanying notes 39–42, 61 (noting the ceiling on federal
reimbursement rates).
73
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, MEDICARE: A STRATEGY FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE,
Vol. I, 21 (K. Lohr, ed. 1990) (noting the Institute of Medicine’s definition for “quality of
care”).
74
See, e.g., Avedis Donabedian, The Quality of Care: How Can it be Assessed?,
260 JAMA 1743, 1743 (1988) (writing that “the goodness of technical performance,” one
element of quality care, “is judged in comparison with the best in practice,” which is in turn
defined as that practice “that is known or believed to produce the greatest improvement in
health.”).
75
See FURROW, supra note 9, at 144–45 (describing Avedis Donabedian’s
explanation of the three approaches to quality assessment: “structure,” “process,” and
“outcome”).
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Analyzing and measuring efficiency, economy, access, and quality is
not always easy; however, states are required to take all four factors into
consideration when proposing adjustments to provider payment rates.76
2. Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, Inc.
In its 2012 decision of Douglas v. Independent Living Center of
Southern California, Inc., the Supreme Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit
a series of challenges to rate cuts imposed by the State of California after
CMS belatedly approved the state’s SPAs. 77 The Court originally granted
certiorari to determine whether the Supremacy Clause provides a private
right of action to enforce § 30(A). 78 In remanding, however, the Court
emphasized the benefits of judicial review under the APA, writing that
CMS’s actions “may require [the plaintiffs] now to proceed by seeking
review of the agency determination under the [APA] . . . rather than in an
action against California under the Supremacy Clause.”79 The Court favored
review under the APA primarily for reasons of certainty, agency expertise,
and consistency. 80 Specifically, the Court noted that the APA provides
plaintiffs with “an authoritative judicial determination of the merits of their
legal claim” and is uniquely equipped to guide the court in evaluating agency
action under the Medicaid Act’s complex statutory scheme.81 The Court also
wrote that review under the APA promotes judicial-agency consistency and
uniformity by preventing discordant judicial and administrative decisions
concerning the same issue.82
Rate setting litigation had previously been marked by a degree of
inconsistency due to the lack of agency guidance in interpreting § 30(A)’s
factors. 83 Uncertainty regarding the proper vehicle through which to
76

See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (including (1) efficiency, (2) economy, (3)
access to health care, and (4) quality health care).
77
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1207–08.
78
Id. at 1208–10.
79
Id. at 1210.
80
See id. at 1210–11.
81
Id. Writing for the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer stated:
The Act provides for judicial review of final agency action. It permits any
person adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action to obtain judicial
review of the lawfulness of that action. And it requires a reviewing court
to set aside agency action found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 702, 704, 706(2)(A) (2014)).
82
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1211.
83
Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342, 26344 (proposed May 6, 2011) (“We are not aware of any
standardized, transparent methodology that is broadly accepted to definitively measure access
to health care services. Partly as a result, there has been no prior Federal rulemaking or
guidance previously on this subject. As a consequence, in implementing their programs, States
lack the guidance that they need to understand the types of information that they are expected
to analyze and monitor in determining compliance with statutory access requirements. This
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challenge state rate adjustments also contributed to inconsistencies. 84
Plaintiffs have historically been forced to use other means to challenge
alleged violations of § 30(A) because the Medicaid Act does not contain a
private right of action. 85 Initially, plaintiffs challenged rate cuts under
§ 1983, a civil rights statute used to vindicate state violations of federal
constitutional and certain statutory rights. 86 The Supreme Court’s narrow,
and relatively recent, construction of § 1983 relating to its use as a vehicle to
enforce Spending Clause statutes, however, has greatly limited use of that
avenue.87 Plaintiffs then turned to the Supremacy Clause to vindicate their
rights, arguing that § 30(A) preempts state rate reductions that fall below the
floor instituted by that provision. 88 The preemption strategy has achieved
success in some Medicaid suits, but the Court has not yet determined its
constitutionality.89

issue has come to light recently, both in litigation and in our review of proposed Medicaid . . .
state plan amendments (SPAs) that would reduce provider payment rates.”).
84
See, e.g., Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle, supra note 24, at 447–50
(describing the discordant judicial interpretations of § 1983 and its viability as a vehicle to
enforce § 30(A)). Moreover, the federal circuit courts utilized various approaches in
interpreting the statute before Douglas. See, e.g., Belshe, 103 F.3d at 1499 (applying the cost
studies approach); Methodist Hosp., Inc. v. Sullivan, 91 F.3d 1026, 1029 (7th Cir. 1996)
(focusing on the access prong of § 30(A)); Ark. Med. Soc., Inc. v. Reynolds, 6 F.3d 519, 529
(8th Cir.1993) (applying the “arbitrary and capricious” test). See also Moncrieff, supra note
37, at 677–691 (providing further discussion on the judicial inconsistencies in interpreting
§ 30(A)).
85
See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The Tenuous Nature Of The Medicaid Entitlement,
22 HEALTH AFF. 145, 146 (2003) (noting the absence of a private right of action in the
Medicaid Act).
86
42 U.S.C § 1983. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 512
(1990) (holding that the Boren Amendment was enforceable under § 1983); Jost, supra note
85, at 146 (writing that from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s, the Supreme Court firmly
recognized the right to enforce certain provisions of the Medicaid Act under § 1983).
87
See Gonzaga Univ., 536 U.S. at 280 (holding that § 1983 confers a right to
privately enforce a Spending Clause statute only where the statute in question “manifests an
unambiguous intent to confer individual rights”). Since Gonzaga Univ., the federal circuit
courts have split on whether patients or providers, or either, may enforce § 30(A) pursuant to a
§ 1983 action. Andrew R. Gardella, The Equal Access Illusion: A Growing Majority of
Federal Courts Erroneously Foreclose Private Enforcement of § 1396a(a)(30) of the
Medicaid Act using 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 697, 733–36 (2008) (discussing the
federal circuit court split that emerged after Gonzaga). Only the Eighth Circuit has interpreted
such a right in both beneficiaries and providers. See Pediatric Specialty Care, Inc. v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Serv., 443 F.3d 1005, 1016 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that § 1983 may be used
by both providers and patients to enforce § 30(A)).
88
See Matthew McKennan, Medicaid Access after Health Reform: The Shifting
Legal Basis for Equal Access, 7 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 477, 499–503 (2011) (discussing
use of the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A)).
89
See, e.g., Lankford v. Sherman, 451 F.3d 496, 509–13 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that the Supremacy Clause likely preempted a state regulation that limited the provision of
durable medical equipment to most categorically-needy Medicaid beneficiaries). The Ninth
Circuit, in an early decision in the Douglas litigation, became the first federal circuit court to
recognize a right of action under the Supremacy Clause to enforce § 30(A). See Living Ctr. of
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas went a long way to
resolve the foregoing inconsistencies in the judicial arena because, consistent
with principles of administrative law, CMS’s reasonable interpretation of
§ 30(A)’s factors will govern the courts’ review of state rate adjustments
under the APA.90 Further, the APA provides a stable means through which to
challenge agency review of SPAs, in contrast to the present state of flux in
which § 1983 and Supremacy Clause actions reside.91 However, the APA’s
standard of review is not as searching as was the Ninth Circuit’s cost studies
test because judicial review of informal agency adjudications (which include
CMS SPA approvals) 92 is governed by the deferential “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review. 93 Furthermore, federal agency actions are
S. Cal., Inc. v. Shewry, 543 F.3d 1050, 1065–66 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Supremacy
Clause may be used to enforce § 30(A)).
90
See infra note 93 and accompanying text (explaining the “arbitrary and
capricious” standard of review).
91
Douglas, 132 S. Ct. at 1210 (discussing the consistency of review under the
APA).
92
Substantive agency action is divided into formal and informal rulemaking and
adjudication. Formal rulemaking and adjudicatory proceedings resemble trial-type
proceedings. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2014) (“This section applies, according to the provisions
thereof, in every case of adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after
opportunity for an agency hearing”). Informal rulemaking is governed by the notice-andcomment provisions contained in § 553 of the APA and is typified by the promulgation of
codified regulations. Id. § 553(b)(3), (c), (d). Informal adjudications consist of all
particularized orders that are not subject to the APA’s formal adjudicatory provisions. See,
e.g., Londoner v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908) (a tax assessment imposed on
one neighborhood was an adjudicatory order, not a legislative rule, and so notice and a hearing
was required prior to its imposition). See also Thomas Moore, Abandoning Mead: Why
Informal Adjudications Should Only Receive Minimal Deference in Federal Courts, 2008
UTAH L. REV. 719, 724–25 (deducing that “adjudications target individuals or ‘a few people’
whereas rulemaking has a broader aim”). As such, informal adjudications, such as U.S.
Customs Service tariff classification rulings, licensing suspensions, deportation decisions, and
approvals of Medicaid SPAs, take varying and multifarious forms. United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001) (tariff classification ruling); Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm’n
Co., 411 U.S. 182 (1973) (licensing suspension); Salameda v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 70 F.3d 447 (7th Cir. 1995) (deportation ruling); Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d
1235 (Medicaid SPA approval).
93
See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2014) (providing that a court on review shall “hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions” it determines to be “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”). The arbitrary
and capricious standard of review governs judicial review of, among other actions, the
discretionary elements of informal administrative adjudications. See MICHAEL ASIMOW &
RONALD M. LEVIN, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 567 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing
the arbitrary and capricious standard of review). Section 706(2)(A) Under the arbitrary and
capricious test, if the court finds that the agency’s action was not reasonable, it generally must
remand the issue back to the agency “for additional investigation or explanation.” Fla. Power
& Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). The court’s review of an agency’s decisionmaking process may only be based on those issues that the agency actually considered. SEC v.
Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (stating that “[i]f an order is valid only as a
determination of policy or judgment which the agency alone is authorized to make and which
it has not made, a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an administrative
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afforded significant deference pursuant to the doctrine set out by Chevron,
USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc. and its progeny. 94 Some commentators have
expressed concern that the APA’s judicial review framework will provide
defendants too much flexibility and deference in rate setting litigation, to the
detriment of Medicaid beneficiaries and providers.95 Given the recency of the
decision, it is too early to say whether such fears will materialize.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs are taking the Supreme Court’s advice in Douglas

judgment. For purposes of affirming no less than reversing its orders, an appellate court
cannot intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively entrusted to an administrative
agency.”). The test is intended to be deferential, while requiring that the agency exhibit
rational decision-making. See ASIMOW & LEVIN, supra note 93, at 576–77. The Supreme
Court famously articulated the arbitrary and capricious test in informal agency actions in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, stating:
[T]he court must consider whether the [agency’s] decision was based on a
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching
and careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is
not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.
401 U.S. 402, 416–17 (1971) (internal citations omitted). An important consideration is
whether the agency considered the “relevant factors” required by the applicable statute or
other source of law in making its decision. Therefore, judicial review of CMS’s approval of
state rate reductions turns on whether CMS reasonably determined that the state assessed the
specific rate adjustments’ impact on § 30(A)’s “relevant factors” of efficiency, economy,
quality, and access. As long as there is evidence in the administrative record sufficient to
allow CMS to determine whether the state considered such factors, and CMS reasonably
considered the state’s evidence, approval of the rate adjustments is not arbitrary and
capricious.
94
See Chevron, USA, Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that
courts must give deference to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes); Mead Corp., 533
U.S. at 226–27 (holding that Chevron deference only applies to interpretations “promulgated
in the exercise of” the agency’s congressionally delegated authority to issue rules carrying the
force of law); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (expanding the contours of
Mead’s analysis by advising courts to consider the following factors before applying Chevron
deference: (1) the legal question’s interstitial nature; the agency’s expertise; (2) the
importance of the question to the administration of the statute; (3) the level of complexity of
administration; and (4) the careful consideration the agency has given the question over a long
period of time). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has determined that CMS SPA approvals
are entitled to Chevron deference. See PhRMA v. Thompson, 362 F.3d 817, 821–22 (D.C. Cir.
2004) (holding that Congress’s express delegation to HHS to review state Medicaid plans and
amendments indicates congress’s intent that such case-by-case adjudications carry the force of
law).
95
See Lindsey Gabrielsen, California Medicaid Amendments: Supreme Court
Vacates and Remands Supremacy Clause Private Right of Action Issue Based on Changed
Conditions – Douglas v. Independent Living Center of Southern California, 38 AM. J. L. &
MED. 751, 753 (2012) (speculating that APA § 706(2)(A) and Chevron will render future rate
setting litigation challenging for plaintiffs); David M. Dirr, High Court Decision Leaves
Medicaid Providers Feeling Uneasy, 24 NO. 5 HEALTH LAW. 34, 37–38 (2012) (suggesting
that future plaintiffs find alternative ways, aside from litigation, to challenge Medicaid rate
cuts).
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and challenging CMS’s review of state rate adjustments under the judicial
review provisions of the APA.96
3. Access, Access, Access
Section 30(A)’s analytical framework is conjunctive: rate
adjustments must be consistent with efficiency, economy, quality, and
access.97 The quality prong, however, has rarely been the focus of litigation,
with most rate setting lawsuits predominately concerning access to care.98 In
fact, § 30(A) is commonly referred to as the “equal access provision.” 99
Whether a given lawsuit primarily concerns access is, of course, dependent
on the plaintiffs’ complaint. Even so, § 30(A) does not, given its grammatical
structure, give states, agencies, and reviewing courts the option to ignore one
or most of its factors. 100 Therefore, the predominant focus on access, as
opposed to efficiency, economy, and quality, seemingly violates Congress’s
directive.
The access-centric focus has not abated after Douglas. The Ninth
Circuit considered a § 30(A) claim in Managed Pharmacy Care v.
Sebelius. 101 Managed Pharmacy Care concerned California’s latest foray
into Medicaid rate cutting. 102 While the court determined that CMS
adequately considered § 30(A)’s requirements, its discussion mainly
concerned the “[h]undreds of pages of analysis submitted by [California] . . .
[concerning] beneficiary access,” including a report issued by the Medicaid
and CHIP Payment and Access Commission (MACPAC), which proposed
the use of a § 30(A) “access framework” in evaluating compliance with the
statute, and which was cited approvingly by the court. 103 Similarly, in
Arizona Hospital & Healthcare Ass’n v. Betlach, the United States District
96

See, e.g., Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d at 1240 (plaintiffs challenging
reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the Supremacy Clause); Christ the King,
730 F.3d at 296 (plaintiff challenging reimbursement rate reductions under the APA and the
Supremacy Clause).
97
42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (emphasis added).
98
See, e.g., Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 993–94;
(focusing on access) Presbyterian Ministries Inc. v. Hood, 235 F.3d 908, 927 n.24 (5th Cir.
2000) (focusing on access); Sullivan, 91 F.3d at 1029 (focusing on access).
99
See Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 800 (referring to the
“equal access provision” under § 30(A)); Moncrieff, supra note 37, at 674 n.11 (noting that
many authorities refer to § 30(A) in its entirety as the “equal access provision,” although that
title actually only applies to that section’s access language).
100
See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(30)(A) (requiring that state plans “assure that
payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care and are sufficient to
enlist enough providers so that care and services are available under the plan at least to the
extent that such care and services are available to the general population in the geographic
area”) (emphasis added).
101
Managed Pharmacy Care, 716 F.3d 1235.
102
Id. at 1239–40.
103
Id. at 1250–51 (citing the MACPAC 2011 Report, which established a threepart test for studying access).
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Court for the District of Arizona upheld Arizona’s proposed rate cuts. 104
While Arizona did not entirely ignore § 30(A)’s quality prong, the state,
CMS, and the court devoted most of its attention to access. 105 Arizona’s
quality findings were brief, consisting almost entirely of a reiteration of the
effects its new access monitoring system would have on quality, its
willingness to transport geographically-isolated beneficiaries to accessible
providers, and a declaration that its overall mission was to provide
“comprehensive, quality health care for all of its members.” 106 The court
found that the federal agency’s consideration complied with § 30(A) merely
because “there [was] evidence in the record that CMS addressed quality.”107
HHS recently issued administrative guidance that further illustrates
the near-singular focus on access in rate setting. In 2011, HHS issued a
proposed rule in response to the lack of agency guidance on Medicaid rate
setting and § 30(A). 108 The proposed rule, however, is based on the
MACPAC report that California relied on in Managed Pharmacy Care.109 As
such, the proposal is entirely concerned with access.110 To ensure compliance
with § 30(A), it proposes that prior to reducing reimbursement rates, states
must submit to CMS “access reviews” that take into account (1) enrollee
needs, (2) provider availability, and (3) utilization of services. 111 The
proposed rule eschews methodologies that focus primarily on providers’
costs, “recogniz[ing] that access to covered services is affected by multiple
factors,” including demographic differences and local market conditions.112
As such, HHS’s proposed rule allows states to evaluate access levels using a
wide variety of data measures, thus permitting “State and Federal review of
beneficiary access to evolve over time and for States to implement effective
and efficient approaches and solutions that are appropriate to their local and
perhaps changing circumstances.” 113 The proposed regulation, therefore, is
104

Ariz. Hosp. & Health Care Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 2d at 986.
See id.at 993–94 (exhibiting the state and CMS’s, as well as the reviewing
court’s, concentration on access).
106
Id. at 995 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
107
Id.
108
Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (proposing a framework addressing access due to the lack of
agency guidance in interpreting § 30(A)).
109
Id. at 26344–45; MACPAC, MARCH 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
MEDICAID AND CHIP, at 125–27 (Mar. 2011), http://www.macpac.gov/reports (follow March
2011 Report) (discussing the framework proposed for examining Medicaid beneficiaries’
access to care).
110
Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. 26342 (proposing an access-focused framework to interpreting
§ 30(A)’s requirements).
111
Id. at 26344–45; MACPAC, MARCH 2011 REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
MEDICAID AND CHIP, at 125–27 (delineating the factors associated with the proposed access
reviews).
112
Medicaid Program; Methods for Assuring Access to Covered Medicaid
Services, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26344.
113
Id. at 26344–47.
105
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not a bright line rule, and has been criticized for its narrow scope, ambiguity,
and insufficient lack of focus on providers’ costs. 114 Whether effective or
not, however, the proposed rule is consistent with the access-centric
approach to rate setting.
C. Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. Secretary U.S. Department of HHS
In Christ the King, the Third Circuit analyzed Pennsylvania’s
nursing home rate adjustment under the quality prong of § 30(A), in marked
contrast to the access-centric approach employed by courts both pre- and
post-Douglas. 115 Christ the King correctly recognizes quality is, as the
statutory language clearly indicates, a standalone factor that CMS must
assess independent of access. 116 As such, it provides guidance to states,
CMS, and plaintiffs regarding the state and federal agencies’ obligation to
independently assess the quality prong of § 30(A) in rate suits initiated under
the APA. This section discusses the factual and procedural history of the case
and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals’ opinion.
1. Factual and Procedural History
Pennsylvania reimburses public and private Medicaid-participating
nursing facilities under the so-called “case-mix” prospective payment
system. 117 Under this system, the Pennsylvania Department of Public
Welfare (PDPW) determines each facility’s per diem rate based on a
calculation that takes into account the costs necessary to run a Medicaid
nursing facility.118 Because the costs of providing care to Medicaid patients
have continuously risen, payments to such facilities under the case-mix
system have risen as well.119 In an effort to curb rising costs, since 2005,
Pennsylvania has consistently applied a budget adjustment factor (BAF) to
114

See Peter Nozicka, The Equal Access Provision: A Destiny of Ambiguity, 21
ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 22, 33 (2011) (noting that the proposed rule is
narrow in scope because it only applies to fee-for-service pricing arrangements, not managed
care, and that, while the equal access provision of § 30(A) focuses on access as regards other
populations in the same geographic locations, the proposed rule focuses on beneficiaries’
needs and provider availability); Rate Setting and Payment Suits, supra note 25, at 840
(lamenting that “[n]owhere in the three-part MACPAC framework adopted by HHS does it
explicitly include provider cost studies or data as a measure of access or payment
sufficiency”).
115
Christ the King, 730 F.3d 291. See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the accesscentric approach exhibited by most courts pre- and post-Douglas).
116
Id. at 309–14 (analyzing Pennsylvania’s failure to examine of the rate
adjustment’s effect on quality of care).
117
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 298; Christ the King Manor v. Com., Dep’t of Pub.
Welfare, 911 A.2d 624, 630 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006) (discussing the case-mix system). The
case-mix system has been in place since 1996. Id.
118
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 298. PDPW takes into account such factors as “the
acuity level of residents” and the “allowable costs” that facilities incur. Id.
119
Id. at 298–99.
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the case-mix rates that decreases reimbursement rates by a certain
percentage.120 As explained by the Third Circuit, “if a case-mix rate of $100
was multiplied by a BAF of 0.900, the resulting reimbursement rate would
be $90, or 10% less than what was called for by the case-mix calculation.”121
Using the BAF, reimbursement rates declined by nearly 2% from 2005 to
2007.122
In 2008, PDPW submitted an SPA to CMS, seeking federal approval
to apply a BAF for 2008–2009 because the BAF for 2007–2008 was set to
expire soon.123 The new BAF decreased the case-mix rate for private nursing
homes by 9.109%. 124 However, because the costs of providing care to
Medicaid patients under the case-mix methodology continued to rise, total
payments to such facilities were estimated to increase by 1% after
application of the BAF. 125 While the SPA was under review, the CMS
employee responsible for evaluating the state’s SPAs contacted PDPW,
inquiring as to whether the new BAF would decrease overall nursing facility
rates, as he believed the SPA indicated.126 PDPW assured the employee that
any such indication was incorrect. 127 Thereafter convinced, based on a
spreadsheet provided by PDPW, that implementation of the proposed SPA
would actually result in higher nursing home rates than if it were not
approved, the employee recommended approval of the SPA, which CMS
gave in December of 2008.128
Nursing homes brought suit against HHS and PDPW in 2009 under
the APA and the Supremacy Clause, alleging that the state violated § 30(A)
because it did not provide CMS with any evidence indicating the BAF’s
effect on nursing home residents’ quality of care. 129 The district court
disagreed and upheld CMS’s approval, “[a]ccording significant deference to
[CMS’s] interpretation of the Medicaid Act.”130 On appeal, the Third Circuit

120

Id.
Id. at 298.
122
Id. at 299 (noting that reimbursement rates to participating nursing home
facilities decreased by cutting 4.878% in 2005 and 6.806% by 2007).
123
Id. at 300. PDPW submitted two SPAs, one concerning public nursing
facilities, the other concerning private nursing facilities. Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 300 n.8.
However, the Third Circuit only discussed the private nursing facilities SPA because plaintiffs
waived their ability to argue the validity of the other SPA when they failed to issue a specific
objection to that SPA at trial and on appeal. Id.
124
Id. at 301–02.
125
Id.
126
Id. at 301.
127
Id.
128
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 301–02. This belief was a misunderstanding for, if
CMS failed to approve the SPA, the current BAF would expire and the case-mix rate would
go unreduced. Id. at 301 n.12.
129
Id. at 302; Opening Brief of Appellants at 28, Christ the King Manor v.
Baldock Assoc., 2012 WL 5986894 (3d Cir. 2013).
130
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 304–05 (citing Christ the King Manor, Inc. v.
Sebelius, 2012 WL 3027543, at *8–9 (M.D. Pa. 2012)).
121

Published by DigitalCommons@Hamline, 2015

19

Hamline Law Review, Vol. 38 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

76

HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:57

Court of Appeals reversed, finding CMS’s review of Pennsylvania’s SPA
“arbitrary and capricious” under the APA.131
2. Third Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that CMS’s approval of
PDPW’s SPA violated § 30(A) because the state agency did not specify in its
SPA application how it settled on the specific BAF at issue.132 The court also
held that the state failed to specify how the new BAF “allows for rates
‘consistent with’” § 30(A), specifically concentrating on quality of care.133
Whereas prior Third Circuit § 30(A) state defendants had supplied CMS with
data from studies analyzing proposed rate adjustments’ effects, stakeholder
input, comparative data from other states, and other evidence in support of
their SPAs, the administrative record here was “remarkably thin.” 134 The
state’s submission to CMS consisted of a cover letter, an SPA submittal
form, notices published in the Pennsylvania Bulletin announcing the
proposed BAF, a chart indicating the state’s Medicaid costs, a description of
the proposed BAF, and the calculation used to determine it.135 Nowhere in its
application did PDPW explain how the rates would affect quality of care.136
CMS maintained that its approval of Pennsylvania’s SPA was not
arbitrary and capricious.137 CMS supported this argument by citing (1) the
lack of any quality concerns associated with previous BAFs, (2) the
projected 1% increase in reimbursement rates under the proposed BAF, (3)
other statutory sources that assure adequate quality of nursing home care,
and (4) assurances by the state agency that the proposed BAF complied with
§ 30(A).138
The court was not persuaded by CMS’s reliance on the state’s past
use of the BAF methodology:
The obvious flaw in that argument is that earlier adjustments
do not reveal how a later and different adjustment may
change a system already affected by the earlier adjustments.
The fifth blow to a boxer’s chin may be no more forceful
than the previous four, but still be forceful enough to shatter
a weakened jaw. And if the fifth blow is more forceful, a “no
worries” mindset is even less warranted. The [proposed]
131

Id. at 305.
Id. at 309.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id. at 309, 301.
136
In fact, the Third Circuit’s description of the record as “thin” may have been
too generous given that the phrase “quality of care” appeared nowhere in the administrative
record. See Opening Brief of Appellants, supra note 129, at 28.
137
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 309.
138
Id. at 309, 312.
132
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adjustment of 9.109% is not necessarily the same in its
impact as the 6.806% adjustment [previously adopted].139
Therefore, previous rates’ effects on quality do not provide sufficient
evidence of currently proposed rates’ effects on quality because “[i]t is
simply not reasonable to conclude that, because prior cuts did not seem too
painful, a deeper cut would not hurt.”140
Regarding the second argument, the court found CMS’s assertion
that the proposed BAF’s projected 1% increase evidenced a lack of any
decrease in nursing home quality misguided. 141 CMS approved the SPA
based, in part, on its conclusion that the proposed BAF was responsible for
the projected rate increase. 142 The court found this conclusion exhibited a
fundamental misunderstanding of the state’s ratemaking methodology.143 The
BAF would not cause an overall rate increase, but rather would stymie an
otherwise larger increase under the case-mix rate absent a cap on growth.144
Were the SPA not implemented after the then-current BAF expired, the casemix rate would not be adjusted.145
The court was similarly unimpressed with CMS’s reliance on other
statutory assurances of quality. 146 The state contended that the federal
Nursing Home Reform Act’s conditions for certification, and nursing homes’
duties under state law to provide quality care, were sufficient to ensure
PDPW’s SPA would not negatively affect quality. 147 The court, however,
wrote that depending on other statutory sources to ensure quality would
“nullif[y] [CMS’s] review process under [§ 30(A)],” and “ignores fiscal
realities by implying that a state can continue to assure quality of care by
holding nursing homes to high standards while simultaneously underfunding
them.”148
Finally, the Third Circuit rejected CMS’s “unsupported assertion that
its [SPA] meets [§] 30(A)’s requirements . . . .”149 Noting that states have
flexibility under the Medicaid Act in adjusting provider rates, the court
reminded the agency that such flexibility is not limitless.150 Section 30(A)
“gives teeth to the [SPA] approval process,” requiring something more than

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 311.
Id.
Id. at 310
Id.
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 310.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 311–12.
Id.
Id. at 312.
Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 312
Id.
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unsupported, conclusory statements. 151 Any contrary interpretation would
render the statute “a dead letter.”152
CMS’s reliance on past rate adjustments and other statutory
provisions, misunderstanding of the state’s rate setting methodology, and
conclusory statements in support of the SPA’s positive effects on quality
ultimately failed to convince the Third Circuit that CMS complied with the
quality prong of § 30(A) when it approved Pennsylvania’s SPA.153 In Christ
the King, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals issued the first post-Douglas
decision that invalidated rate adjustments under the APA. The opinion,
however, is even more significant in that its discussion focused almost
exclusively on quality, as opposed to access.154 Christ the King indicates that
§ 30(A)’s quality prong is an independent factor in rate reviews going
forward, especially when the affected providers consist of institutions that,
like nursing homes, are not at risk of leaving the Medicaid program due to
their favorable status under the Medicaid Act.155
III. ANALYSIS
Christ the King stands for the proposition that states and CMS must
treat quality as the truly independent factor of § 30(A) that it is. 156
Anomalous in its focus on quality, the Third Circuit’s discussion provides
helpful guidelines for states and CMS going forward. 157 While Christ the
King is unlikely to bring an end to litigants’ access arguments, especially
when the plaintiffs consist of providers other than, for example, nursing
homes, states and CMS should keep in mind its emphasis on quality of care

151

Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 313.
153
Id. at 309–14.
154
See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the pre- and post-Douglas access-centric
approach to § 30(A)).
155
See Sidney D. Watson, From Almshouses to Nursing Homes and Community
Care: Lessons from Medicaid’s History, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938–40 (explaining the
Medicaid Act’s institutional bias towards nursing homes exhibited by the fact that Medicaid
substantially funds nursing homes and was intended by Congress to direct beneficiaries into
nursing homes for the provision of long-term care). One million out of 1.5 million nursing
home residents receive Medicaid. FURROW, supra note 9, at 140. About half of all national
expenditures concerning long-term care stem from Medicaid. William Pipal, You Don’t Have
to Go Home, But You Can’t Stay Here: The Current State of Federal Nursing Home
Involuntary Discharge Laws, 20 ELDER L. J. 235, 244 (2012).
156
See supra text accompanying note 155 (explaining that Christ the King’s focus
on quality indicates that reviewing agencies and courts must account for quality of care when
analyzing compliance with § 30(A)).
157
See infra Part III.A–C (discussing the guidelines provided by the Christ the
King decision).
152
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in the event that Christ the King spurs more active judicial inquiry into
defendants’ assessments of quality. 158
Pennsylvania’s rate adjustments were not upheld despite the
deferential review afforded rate decisions under the APA. 159 This should
provide warning to states and CMS to seriously consider all of § 30(A)’s
factors when making and reviewing changes to Medicaid provider
payments. 160 Christ the King, however, also provides specific guidance
concerning state assessments of quality. 161 Finding CMS’s reliance on an
SPA that did not discuss the quality prong of § 30(A) “arbitrary and
capricious,” the Third Circuit emphasized the need for independent
examination of state rate adjustments’ effects on quality by the state, and a
concomitant duty on the part of CMS to require such an examination.162 This
overall theme is embedded in the court’s discrete responses to CMS’s blatant
disregard for the lack of any quality assessment by Pennsylvania, and the
agency’s reliance on independent assurances of, and past rate adjustments’
effects on, quality.163
A. Quality Analysis
One of Christ the King’s most important, and perhaps obvious,
guidelines is that states must include an assessment of quality in their SPA
submissions.164 Issues of access may more directly affect providers that do
not receive as substantial funding from Medicaid as do nursing homes;
however, issues regarding the quality of health care provided obviously
concern more than simply nursing homes. 165 In any event, Pennsylvania’s

158
See infra text accompanying and note 165 (explaining that nursing homes’
beneficial status under the Medicaid Act renders them at low risk of leaving the Medicaid
program).
159
See Christ the King, 730 F.3d at 314 (stating that “from the record there was no
reasoned basis for the agency’s decision” and therefore the approval of PDPW’s SPA was
“arbitrary and capricious”).
160
See supra Part II.C.2 (illustrating that the Christ the King decision indicates
that all of § 30(A)’s factors, including quality, must be assessed by states and the federal
government in reviewing rate adjustments) (emphasis added).
161
See infra Part III.A–C (discussing the guidelines provided by the Christ the
King decision).
162
See supra text accompanying note 153 (explaining that the Third Circuit in
Christ the King held that reliance on past rate adjustments and other statutory provisions and
conclusory statements in support of the SPA’s positive effects on quality are no substitutes for
actual review of an SPA’s effects on quality of care).
163
See supra II.C.2 (discussing the court’s disapproval of the state’s quality
analysis demanded by § 30(A) in Christ the King).
164
See supra Part II.C.2 (stating that the Christ the King court held that CMS’s
review of Pennsylvania’s SPA was arbitrary and capricious because it did not discuss how the
adjustment affected quality of care).
165
See supra text accompanying note 9 (noting that quality of care implicates all
provider settings and patient experiences).
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SPA provided no individual examination of quality. 166 Plaintiffs are not
generally concerned with issues of economy and efficiency, factors that
impose a nebulous federal ceiling on Medicaid reimbursement rates. 167
Therefore, the effects on quality of care in nursing homes was the only
§ 30(A) issue implicated by Pennsylvania’s SPA.168 Even so, the state did not
discuss quality, and CMS approved the state’s SPA regardless.169
The obvious lesson for states and reviewing agencies is, then, to
include, and require, an assessment of quality in SPAs. Measuring quality, of
course, is not an easy task.170 The Third Circuit made clear, however, that
conclusory, unsupported assurances of quality will not suffice. 171 In the
nursing home context, institutions regularly collect data measuring resident
satisfaction. 172 Also, CMS provides nursing home quality ratings on its
Nursing Home Compare website. 173 The website reviews nursing homes
based on a “Five-Star Quality Rating System” both as to a nursing home’s
overall score, and as to health inspections, staffing, and “quality measures”
(QMs).174 The website contains general “nursing home information” for each
institution that indicates whether the nursing home participates in
Medicaid.175
States should use data from, or of the sort compiled on, Nursing
Home Compare to measure the quality levels of its nursing homes and other
166
See supra Part II.C.2 (explaining that Pennsylvania’s SPA contained an
inadequate examination of quality of care as required by § 30(A)).
167
See supra text accompanying note 61(explaining that § 30(A)’s first two
factors set the federal ceiling).
168
See supra Part II.C.1 (writing that the plaintiffs in Christ the King brought suit
due to the state and federal agencies’ lack of assessment of the adjustment’s effects on
quality).
169
See supra Part II.C.1 (explaining that CMS approved Pennsylvania’s SPA even
though the submission did not discuss quality).
170
See supra text accompanying notes 73–75 (explaining that quality is a difficult
concept to define and measure).
171
See supra Part II.C.2 (reviewing the Christ the King court’s rejection of CMS’s
unsupported assertions that the SPA comported with § 30(A)).
172
See, e.g., Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Nursing Home Quality Initiative,
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Quality-Initiatives-Patient-Assessment-Instruments/
NursingHomeQualityInits/index.html?redirect=/NursingHomeQualityInits (last updated Apr.
4, 2014) (providing “consumer and provider information regarding the quality of care in
nursing homes”).
173
Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/nursing
homecompare (last visited Nov. 22, 2014).
174
Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., Five-Star Quality Rating System,
CMS.GOV, http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and-Certification/Certification
andComplianc/FSQRS.html (last updated Apr. 20, 2014) (describing the “Five-Star Quality
Rating System”). QMs consist of “physical and clinical measures for nursing home residents”
collected by nursing homes. Id
175
See, e.g., Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov
/nursinghomecompare/profile.html#profTab=0&ID=265672&loc=63109&lat=38.5844193&ln
g=-90.2948797 (last visited May 12, 2014) (providing general information on a nursing home
located in St. Louis, Missouri).
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similarly situated long-term care institutions and services. Nursing Home
Compare evaluates nursing homes’ staffing levels by assessing the number
of residents in each respective institution and the number of nurse and
physical therapist (PT) staff hours expended per resident per day. 176 The
number of hours expended by registered nurses, licensed practical and
licensed vocational nurses, certified nursing assistants, and PTs per resident
per day is calculated by dividing the number of hours worked by
professionals in each respective group two weeks before inspection by the
number of residents.177
Each nursing home’s recent health inspection information is posted
on Nursing Home Compare. 178 Inspection results are divided into the
following categories: health deficiencies, fire safety deficiencies, and
complaints and facility-reported incidents.179 Health deficiencies are further
categorized by mistreatment deficiencies, quality care deficiencies, resident
right deficiencies, nutrition and dietary deficiencies, pharmacy services
deficiencies, and environmental deficiencies. The data for an institution’s
health deficiencies includes the date of the last health inspection and a copy
of the full inspection report, the dates of complaint inspections, the total
number of health deficiencies found in the institution, and the average
number of health deficiencies found in the state in which the institution is
located, as well of the entire country.180
QMs are divided into those measures affecting long-term (“long
stay”) residents, and those affecting short-term (“short stay”) residents. 181
There are thirteen long stay resident QMs, including the percentage of longterm residents who: (1) have experienced one or more falls resulting in major
injury; (2) were physically restrained; (3) lost too much weight; (4) have
depressive symptoms; and (5) have or had a catheter inserted and left in their
bladder.182 Short-stay QMs consist of the percentage of short-term residents
who: (1) self-report moderate to severe pain; (2) have new or worsened
pressure ulcers; (3) were appropriately given seasonal influenza vaccination;
(4) were appropriately given pneumococcal vaccination; and (5) have been
recently prescribed antipsychotic medication.183
The foregoing data metrics could prove useful to states in assessing
the present quality levels of institutional providers, or at the very least of
176
See, e.g., id. (providing staffing analysis on a nursing home located in St.
Louis, Missouri).
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov/
nursinghomecompare/profile.html#profTab=1&ID=265600&loc=63109&lat=38.5844193&ln
g=-90.2948797 (last visited May 12, 2014).
181
Nursing Home Compare, MEDICARE.GOV, http://www.medicare.gov
/NursingHomeCompare/About/Quality-Measures-Info.html (last visited May 12, 2014).
182
Id.
183
Id.
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nursing homes, and in predicting future rate adjustments’ effects on such
levels. Due to its focus on nursing homes, information of this nature may not
prove as useful in evaluating the quality of care provided by individual
providers. In any event, it is likely, given their favorable treatment under the
Medicaid Act, that institutional long-term care providers will be the most
likely to bring quality of care claims.184
States may also measure quality by patient satisfaction or outcome
data, or other measurements. Regardless of the data gathered and assessed,
however, the submission of studies and analyses on quality is necessary.185
Therefore, states would do well to formulate quality assessment procedures
and guidelines in order to prevent judicial invalidation of CMS’s approval of
rate adjustments. 186 A website like Nursing Home Compare would have
provided Pennsylvania useful information in studying and assessing its rate
adjustment’s effects on the quality levels of its nursing homes.
B. Independent Assurances of Quality
Christ the King also provided that, whatever data states use to
analyze rate reductions’ effects on quality of care, quality standards imposed
by other sources are not sufficient substitutes for independent assessment.187
Pennsylvania relied, in part, on the Nursing Home Reform Act’s survey and
certification provisions, and comparative state monitoring requirements, in
arguing that its SPA would not have a negative impact on quality. 188 The
Third Circuit’s opinion, however, indicates that § 30(A) requires an
independent analysis on the part of the state into each specific rate
adjustment’s impact on quality of care.189 This implies that the whole range
of quality improvement mechanisms used by states and providers in
achieving quality of care, such as regulations, credentialing actions, risk
management procedures, market competition, and other tools are not enough,
alone, to satisfy compliance with § 30(A)’s quality prong.

184

See supra text accompanying note 155 (noting that nursing homes receive
favorable treatment under Medicaid).
185
See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the finding in Christ the King that
Pennsylvania’s SPA was arbitrary and capricious because it did not contain a discussion of its
effect on quality of care).
186
See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing the court’s rejection of
CMS’s reliance on other statutory assurances of quality in Christ the King).
187
See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection
of CMS’s reliance on statutory assurances of quality other than § 30(A)).
188
See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing CMS’s statutory arguments
in Christ the King).
189
See text accompanying notes 146–148 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection
of CMS’s reliance on statutory assurances of quality other than § 30(A)).
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C. Past Quality Rates
Lastly, Christ the King indicates that the lack of evidence of prior
rate adjustments’ negative effects on quality does not satisfy § 30(A), even if
the current rate adjustments are devised by the same methodology and
prompted by the same concerns as were those implemented previously. 190
The past effects of rate adjustments are certainly helpful in assessing the
possible effects of future rates, just as the efficacy rates of independent
quality improvement mechanisms are helpful in assessing the current state of
a patient’s quality of care. As with reliance on independent quality tools,
however, a lack of decline in quality rates from prior adjustments does not
indicate that a new round of adjustments will not have a detrimental effect.191
Citing a history of a lack of detrimental effects on quality is no substitute for
a responsible degree of investigation and analysis by the state.192
Christ the King indicates that § 30(A) requires independent
assessment of quality.193 It implies that, of the hundreds of pages submitted
by California in support of the rate cuts upheld in Managed Pharmacy Care,
some pages should have explicitly discussed the cuts’ effects on quality of
care. 194 Christ the King also implies that Arizona, in Arizona Hospital &
Healthcare Ass’n v. Betlach, should have focused more of its resources on
evaluating the independent effects of its cuts on quality.195 Further, Christ the
King indicates that, instead of promulgating a regulation that focuses
exclusively on access, HHS should consider providing guidance as to how
states should assess quality as well.196 States need to gather and assess data
metrics that allow them to determine the extent to which quality of care will
be affected by the imposition of rate changes. This requires that states rely on
up-to-date, not past, data, and something more than independent or
unsupported assurances of quality.

190
See text accompanying notes 139–140 (discussing Christ the King’s rejection
of CMS’s argument that past rate adjustments’ effects on quality are sufficient to satisfy
§ 30(A)’s mandate).
191
See text accompanying notes 139–140. (discussing Christ the King’s
assessment that previous rates’ effects on quality do not sufficiently evidence current rate
proposals’ effects on quality).
192
See text accompanying notes 139–140.
193
See supra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need to analyze
quality after Christ the King).
194
See supra text accompanying notes 101–103 (discussing the Managed
Pharmacy Care case).
195
See supra text accompanying notes 104–107 (discussing Ariz. Hosp. & Health
Care Ass’n).
196
See supra text accompanying notes 108–114 (discussing the proposed
regulation based on the MACPAC report).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Since the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Douglas,
Medicaid providers and beneficiaries have pursued alleged § 30(A)
violations under the APA’s judicial review provisions.197 Christ the King, a
product of Douglas, stands for the proposition that courts reviewing § 30(A)
APA claims must inquire into the state and federal agencies’ assessments of
quality. 198 Measuring quality of care is a complicated issue that would
benefit from guidance by CMS or the utilization of tools such as Nursing
Home Compare. 199 No matter the metrics used, states must analyze and
report on quality, lest they risk invalidation of their SPAs as Pennsylvania
did in Christ the King.200 Quality is an independent factor of § 30(A), and it
appears that the courts may be beginning to acknowledge this fact.

197

See supra Part II.B (discussing the current state of rate setting litigation).
See supra text accompanying notes 164–171 (discussing the need for analyzing
quality after Christ the King).
199
See supra texts accompanying notes 172–175 (discussing Medicaid.gov’s
Nursing Home Compare website).
200
See supra Part III.A (discussing the need to analyze quality of care to comply
with § 30(A) after Christ the King).
198
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